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Summary  findings
Financial markets and financial institutions compete to  and banks make fewer long-term loans. Moreover, the
provide investors with liquidity. Diamond examines the  banking sector's ability to subsidize those with immediate
roles of banks and markets when both are active,  liquidity need is reduced.
characterizing how development of the financial markets  More liquid markets also lead to physical investment
affects the structure of and market share of banks.  with longer maturity, a smaller gap between the maturity
Banks create liquidity by offering claims with a higher  of financial assets and the maturity of physical
short-term return than exist without a banking system.  investments. Financial assets have a shorter maturity than
The amount of liquidity that banks offer depends on the  physical investments, but this gap approaches zero as the
degree of direct participation in financial markets - that  market approaches full liquidity.
is, on the liquidity of financial markets. Conversely,  Diamond provides an analytical basis for developing
banks influence the amount of liquidity offered by  short-term markets as a way to stimulate the supply of
financial markets.  long-term finance and supports the practitioner's view
As more investors participate in financial markets,  that short-term financial markets are a prerequisite for
allowing markets to provide more liquidity, banks shrink  the development of viable long-term finance.
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Financial  markets  and financial  institutions  compete  as ways of providing  borrowers  with access  to
capital  and of providing  liquidity  to investors. This paper  examines  the roles of markets  and banks when
both are active,  characterizing  the effects  of financial  market  development  on both the structure  and market
share of banks. Banks create  liquidity  by offering  claims with higher short-term  returns for given long-term
returns  than exist  without  the banking  system. The  amount  of liquidity  that banks offer is influenced  by the
liquidity  (degree  of direct participation)  in the financial  market. Conversely,  the amount  of liquidity  that
markets  offer is influenced  by the activities  of banks. As direct participation  in markets  increases,  and
markets  provide  more liquidity,  the banking  sector  shrinks,  with banks' holdings  of long-term  assets  falling
most rapidly,  while  the ability  of the banking  sector  to subsidize  those with immediate  liquidity  needs is
reduced. More liquid markets  also lead  to longer  maturity  physical  investment,  a longer  average  maturity  of
financial  assets, and a smaller gap between  the maturity  of financial  assets and physical  investments. If the
financial  market is illiquid  (not all investors  participate  continuously),  financial  assets  have a shorter
maturity  than do real investments,  but this gap approaches  zero as the market approaches  full liquidity.
Financial  markets  are imperfectly  liquid  in this model. I use a very general,  but not very deep,
characterization  of the amount  of liquidity  in markets. Liquidity  is limited  because  of limited  participation
in secondary  markets. Only a fraction  of those investors  who do not have  a special motive to trade (such a
need for immediate  cash) are active  in the market. Many  models  with private  information  about  the value of
assets  have implications  similar  to the limited  participation model. My model  has limited  participation,  but
no explicit  private information  about  the value of assets:  assets are riskless. Even  without  private
information,  the cost of time in the market  suggests  that some investors  will not always  participate  in
markets. In the model,  there are no frictions  or transaction  costs inhibiting  trade between  the subset  of
investors  who are active in the market. The limited  participation/illiquid  market influences  the prices  at
which  trade takes place between  the active  investors  and the real investments  decisions  made in anticipation
of the prices  that will prevail.  Related models  that use limited  participation  for different  purposes  are
Merton [1987]  which examines  and the effect on the relative  prices  of risky assets when some investorsparticipate  only in a subset  of asset markets,  and Allen  and Gale [1994],  which examines  the implications  of
limited  participation  for the volatility  of asset prices. Wallace [1988]  argues that the Diamond-Dybvig
[1983]  model  can usefully  be interpreted  as a model  where no investors  participate  in financial markets
because  they are separated.
The need for liquidity  is generated  by uninsurable  uncertainty  about  the desired  timing of
consumption. Formally,  these are uninsurable  (due to private information)  preference  shocks,  as in Bryant
[1980]  and Diamond-Dybvig  [1983]. As in Diamond-Dybvig  [1983],  the desired  amount  of liquidity  is
increasing  in the degree  of risk aversion,  because  investors  are willing  to give  up some long-term  return  to
avoid losses  from liquidating  assets. The Diamond-Dybvig  model  explains  why banks  would create
liquidity  by cross-subsidizing  some depositors:  they offer those who withdraw  early for liquidity  a high
return  that partly  comes  at the expense  of those who do not withdraw  early. Bank deposits  provide  more
liquidity  than holding  assets directly,  and investors  all invest  through  the bank.  The model does not
consider  markets--  the illiquidity  of assets is an assumed  part of technology  and markets  are not needed.
The illiquidity  of assets in this paper's model  comes from limited  participation  in markets. This
allows a role for markets  and for banks. It also provides  a framework  to study the interaction  between  banks
and markets. The Diamond-Dybvig  model,  where illiquidity  is not linked  to the operations  of markets,  has
been interpreted  as being inconsistent  with active  markets. Jacklin  [1987] shows  that if there exists a
competitive  secondary  market  where bank deposits  trade for other financial  assets, then banks  cannot cross-
subsidize  investors  with differing  needs for liquidity. In addition  to Jacklin [1987],  Haubrich  and King
[1990],  von Thadden  [1991],  and Hellwig  [1994]  examine  the effects  of competitive  and perfectly  liquid
financial  markets,  and reach largely  negative  conclusions  about viability  of bank liquidity  creation. This has
been interpreted  as meaning  that the cross-subsidization  role of banks  is incompatible  with an active
2financial  market.' This paper shows  that when the illiquidity  of assets is due to illiquidity  of markets, banks
create  liquidity  in two ways: by holding  some of the economy's assets  to fill in for gaps due to limited
participation  in markets  and also by cross-subsidization.  Banks and markets  coexist and influence  each
other's activities.
A banking  system  that competes  with an illiquid  financial  market  produces liquidity  directly  and
indirectly. Banks  produce  liquidity  directly  by offering  deposits  that offer more liquidity  than the market.
They produce  liquidity  indirectly,  because  offering  liquid  deposits  makes financial  markets  more liquid  than
they would  otherwise  be.  Investors' partial  reliance  on the banking  system as a source  of liquidity  diverts
some of their demand  for liquidity  from financial  markets. The banking  system influences  the price of
liquidity  in the market,  which influences  the desirability  of holding  assets  directly. In addition,  the banking
system's effect on the liquidity  of the market influences  the desirability  of holding  claims that can be issued
by other,  competing  banks. The influence  of the market liquidity  on the desirability  of alternative  bank
claims implies  that the claims offered  by banks  are subject  to an ex-ante coalition  constraint  that other banks
not be able to offer dominating  claims, as well as the ex-ante constraint  that an individual  not prefer  to hold
all assets directly.
1.1  Limited Participation:  Motivation
The model presented  below is based on limited  participation  in financial  markets  by investors.
There are several motivations  for this limited  participation,  including  differential  opportunity  costs of time,
but the way it is specified  in the model is best motivated  by information  asymmetry,  where some investors
cannot  easily evaluate  some assets.  No formal  analysis  of information  acquisition  costs is presented,  and
limited  participation  is simply  assumed. Only a fraction  of investors  are active in the secondary  market  at a
given  time. This limited  participation  reduces  the ability  of financial  markets  alone  to reallocate  claims and
'The Jacklin  result drops  the Diamnond-Dybvig  assumption  that consumption  is observable  and
that those who  withdraw  use the proceeds  for consumption.
3consumption  goods as investors'  desired  holdings  change  unexpectedly.
Markets  with low investor  participation  rates are  those with less developed  financial  markets.
Improved  information  disclosure  systems  and better legal enforcement  of contracts  allow more investors  to
participate  directly  in markets. The model  explores  how  increased  financial  market  participation  influences
the role  and structure  of the banking  system and the maturity  structure  of real and financial  assets.
There are three dates 0, 1 and 2. As of date 0, all investors  are identical,  but each is uncertain  when
he or she will need to consume  and have need liquidity. On date 1, investors  learn their type. Type I
investors  need  to consume  on date 1, and place no value on date-2  consumption. They  will sell any assets
they  own on date 1. All type I investors  participate  in financial  markets  because  consumption  needs
provide  a strong  motivation  to trade. Type 2 investors  want  to consume  on date 2, and place no value on
date I consumption. Some  type 2 investors  will participate  in a market for hard-to-value  assets (because
they have the information  or expertise  to value assets),  and others will not. Type  2 investors  who participate
and are active  in the market are denoted  as type 2A investors. Type  2 investors  who do not participate  in the
market are denoted  as type 2B agents. Only types I and 2A are active in the financial  market.
On date 0, investors  do not yet know  their type (all are identical). Apart from any financial  claim
offered  by financial  institutions,  investors  can choose between two types of real assets. The first is a one-
period,  self-liquidating,  short-term  asset that yields a one period  ahead  cash flow of Rs I per unit invested
(with constant  retums  to scale). This asset is available  at date 0 or date 1. The second  real asset is a two-
period  long-term  asset that yields a two-period  ahead  cash flow of X>R 2 (with constant  returns to scale) and
nothing  in one period. Because  X>R 2, the long-term  asset generates  higher  date-2  value than repeatedly
using  the short-term  asset. The long-term  asset can be sold in the secondary  market at date 1. Type 2B
investors  do not participate  in the market for the long-term  asset at date 1, implying  that any capital invested
on date I by type 2B investors  will go into new short-term  assets. On date 1, type 1 investors  sell long-term
assets  to type 2A investors. The price of the long-term  asset on date-I depends  on the fractions  of investor
4types and on financial  institutions  or other contractual  arrangements  that are in place.
The limited  participation  in financial  markets  is important  for the allocation  of capital  to long-term
versus short-term  real assets and to the consumption  opportunities  available  to investors. Investors  can limit
the need to use financial  markets  by entering into  contracts  at date 0 that limit the need  to trade assets  at date
I and reduce  the imbalances  in financial  markets. However,  because  some investors  are able to trade (types
I and 2A),  the types of institutions  that fill in the gaps in markets  must take account  of their trading
opportunities. Limited  participation  implies  that institutions  must fill in for those who are not active in
markets,  and also take account  of the opportunities  available  to those who do participate  in markets.
Holmstrom  and Tirole [1995]  provides  an alternative  motivation  for limited  participation  in their study  of
private  and government-provided  liquidity:  it motivates  limited  participation  by moral hazard  in borrowing
firms, as in Diamond  [19911. Gorton-Pennacci  [1990]  examines  the ability  of intermediaries  or firms to
create riskless  securities  when private information  causes problems  in risky asset markets. Their paper  does
not have limited  participation  in markets,  but their results  have a related  focus.
1.2  The Role of Financial  Institutions
Financial  institutions  can substitute  for illiquid  markets. Institutions  can economize  on the holding
of liquid  assets by avoiding  the possibility  that nonparticipating  type 2B agents  hold excessive  liquidity. It
is also possible,  given  the informational  motivation  for limited  participation,  that financial  institutions  could
participate  in markets  on behalf of investors. Both roles for financial  institutions  are examined. No costs of
operating financial  institutions  are introduced,  in th: interest  of simplicity. The existence  of variable  costs,
however,  would  suggest  that to implement  a given  set of consumption  opportunities,  there should  be
smallest  possible scale  of the banking  industry. This allows the model to analyze  the effects of financial
market development  on the scale and activities  of the banking  sector.
1.3  Outline  of the Paper
Section  2 describes  the model and characterizes  the total amount  of liquidity  optimally  created  by
5the combination  of the financial  markets  and the banking  system. This characterization  is stated in terms  of
the consumption  opportunities  offered  to investors. Section  3 shows how  financial  market  development  that
increases  the liquidity  of financial  markets  changes  the amount  of liquidity  provided  by banks. Section  4
describes  the implications  of optimal  liquidity  creation  for the scale  of the banking  industry,  the contracts
the banking  system  offers, the assets that banks fund with those deposits,  and the maturity  structure  of
financial  and real assets.  Section  5 presents  a detailed  example  to illustrate  the results in the paper.
Section  6 concludes  the paper.
2.  The Model
There are three dates 0, 1 and 2. As of date 0, all investors  are identical,  but each is uncertain  about
which date he or she will need to consume  and need liquidity. Each is endowed  with one unit of date-O
capital. There  are three types of agents  as of date 1: type 1,  type 2A and type 2B.  As of date 0, an investor
is of type  r  on date 1 with probability  q,. Define  c,, as the consumption  on date t of a type r investor. Type
1 agents  will need liquidity:  they  need to consume  at date 1, and have utility  of date 1 consumption  U(c,,).
Type I agents  place no value on date 2 consumption. Types  2A and 2B do not need liquidity  on date I and
place no value on date-  I consumption. The only difference  between  the two types differ is their
participation  in a secondary  market for assets on date 1. Type  2A agents  are active in the secondary  market,
and type  2B agents  are not active. They  have identical  utility  functions:  their utility  is U(C 22j) forje{A,B}.
Investors  are risk averse. Formally,  each  has a state-dependent  utility  function,  where  the state is
private information. The form of the utility function  is:
U(c)  if j  is of type  in state e
u(c  ,C2;  a)  '
u(,,c 2;  ~  U(c2)  if j  is of  tpe  2A or 2B in  ste  O
where U:R++  - R is twice continuously  differentiable,  increasing,  strictly  concave,  and satisfies  Inada
conditions  U'(O)=m,  and U'(-)=O. Also,  the relative risk aversion  coefficient -cU"(c)/U'(c)>  I everywhere.
6Investors  maximize  expected  utility. These preferences  are identical  to those assumed  in Diamond-Dybvig
[1983],  except here types 2A and 2B are distinguished. Diamond-Dybvig  [1983]  allows no secondary
market,  which essentially  assumes  that are only types I and 2B.
Liquidity  is assumed  to be difficult  to obtain. Real  asset investments  that payoff quickly  are less
profitable  than long-term  investments. In addition,  the limited  participation  in secondary  markets  limits
their ability to allocate all available  liquidity  to its best use.  There are two types of real assets. The  first is
a one-period  short-term  asset that yields  a one period  ahead  cash flow of Rs 1 per unit invested  (with
constant  returns to scale). The second  real asset is a two-period  long-term  asset that yields a two-period
ahead  cash flow of X>R 2 (with constant  returns  to scale) and nothing  in one period. The long-term  asset can
be sold in the secondary  market  at date 1.
In the Diamond-Dybvig  [1983] model  there are no secondary  markets,  but long-term  assets can be
physically  liquidated  for a return that weakly  exceeds  the return on short-term  assets,  implying  that all
investment  should  be long-term. 2 The current  model implies  a non-trivial  decision  on how to allocate
investment  between  short and long-term  assets, due to potential  for illiquidity  of asset markets.
Investors  have a demand  for liquidity,  and the most profitable  assets  may be illiquid. Financial
institutions  such as banks  can improve  liquidity  in two ways. By centralizing  the holding  of liquid  assets,
the institution  reduces  the opportunity  cost of excess liquidity  held by those investors  who do not participate
in the market. In addition,  there is some ability  to cross-subsidize  investors:  investors  who  need to consume
unexpectedly  at date I (type 1) receive  higher  returrns  at the expense  of those who neither  need to consume
nor are actively  trading in the market (type  2B).
To characterize  the role of intermediaries  and markets in providing  the optimal  amount  of liquidity,
I solve for the ex-ante optimal  set of incentive-compatible  consumption  opportunities,  and later determine
2Diamond-Dybvig  also assume  that R=1. The minor  generalization  to Rs 1 is not important  to
the results in this draft.
7how  these are related  to markets  and intermediaries.
The optimal  financial  mechanism  solves  the following  maximization  problem.
ma  IF - '  %A  2BqU  (Cl 1  ).q2AU(c=2).q2BU  (cV2B)
Subject  to several  constraints. First is the resource  constraint:
q,c,,  ,  quc,2A  ,  q3 cB 1 ,2  qlc 21 ,  *2e.,  q2ac  S
R  X
Consumption  on the "wrong"  date (by a type who assigns  no value to consumption  on that date) is never
optimal,  and at the optimum  C21=Cl 2A=CI 2B=O
There are two additional  types of constraints. At date-O,  investors  must choose to join the financial
mechanism,  instead  of either investing  directly,  or joining a competing  mechanism.  In addition,  at date-  I the
realized  type of each agent is private information.  As a result, it must be incentive-  compatible  for each to
self-select  the consumption  stream implied  by the optimal  mechanism.
On date 1,  an agent who  joins this financial  mechanism  will be given  a choice  of claims on date-  I
and on date-2 consumption.  I defer discussion  of the institutional  details  of how intermediaries  implement
the optimal  incentive-compatible  consumption  opportunities.  The standard  method for characterizing  the
optimal  consumption  is to examine  direct mechanisms  where each investor  reveals  his or her type, and is
given  type-continent  consumption  on each date, subject  to the constraint  that each investor  is willing  to
make an honest report.
Investors  of type 1 and 2A have  the ability  to trade anonymously  at date 1, and to privately  consume
the proceeds  from those trades.  The individuals  can write  contracts  where they exchange  payments  at date
O  for promised  payments  at date I and date 2, but they cannot  be prevented  from trading  these claims among
themselves. Trade will turn out to be required  to support  the optimal  mechanism. It is simplest  to
characterize  the financial  mechanism  in terms of the holding,  before any trade, of date-I and date-2  claims
8on date I by each  type of investor,  rather  than the final consumption  of each investor  type after trade occurs.
Let Wft  denote  the date-I holding  of date t claims by a type s investor. Most  of the analysis  is most
compactly  stated in terms of Wt, and it is a useful input into determining  the assets  that investors  hold
directly  and those held indirectly  through  banks. This decomposition  of date-  I holdings  before  trade is
briefly described  in the next section. This section  could be skipped  on first reading  to avoid  extra details.
2.1  Direct  Holdings  and  Bank  Claims
Date-  I holding  of claims by investors  (before  any trade) include  the direct holdings  chosen  on date
O  plus the claims  that they obtain  from financial  intermediaries.  Let at denote  the proportion  of date 0
capital invested  directly  assets maturing  on date  te{ 1,2},  and let p denote the proportion  of date 0 capital
invested  through  the intermediary  mechanism. The date-O  resource  constraint  is a8 + 62 +  p S  1.  On date-I,
each investor  has direct holding  of claims on date t consumption  of d,, where d,j= R and d2=6 2X.
The claims obtained  or "withdrawn"  from financial  intermediaries  are denoted  by lower case w:
define  wt, as the claim on date-t consumption  "withdrawn"  by a type v investor  at date te{  1,2},  who
"deposited"  a fraction p of his or her endowment  of one unit at date 0 . The total claim,  Wt, on date t
consumption  held by investor  type s on date I (before  any trade) is: Wt=dt + w,.
I examine  cases where banks  have no market-trading  advantages  over individuals  and where banks
can participate  in the market  on behalf of its non-participating  members. The model's implications  are
similar in each case. If banks trade in the market at date 1, then banks  offer date-2  claims in exchange  for
date-I claims (or vice versa), and these  offers would be available  only to those who participate  in the market
(types I and 2A). The notation  for bank trades in the market is as follows.  Let m 2 denote  the net number
of date-2  claims sold in the market by banks on date-I to buy claims  that mature on date I (both expressed
as a proportion  of the per-capita  date-0 endowment).  If instead  the bank is on balance  buying  date 2 claims,
then m 2=O  and m 1>O  is the number  of date-I claims  the bank is selling  (in the same  units).  If banks have no
advantages  over investors,  then like type 2B agents,  banks cannot  buy existing  date-2 maturing  assets (with
9maturing  assets' proceeds)  at date-  1, and m,=O  and m 2 ,O  is required. If the bank does not trade at all on
date 1,  then m1=m 2=O. I defer  further  discussion  of the bank's trading  to section  4.
Types I and 2A can trade in the market at date 1. This implies  that the consumption  on date 1 of
type 1 agents  must satisfy qlc,, s q,W,l + q2AW12A  + m,. Consumption  of date 2 by type 2A agents  must
satisfy  q2Ac22A  s q1W2, + q2AW 22A  + m2 + R(q,W,,  + q2AW12A  + m,). Type  2B agents  do not have access  to
the financial  market and can make use of claims on date-I consumption  only by investing  in new short-term
investments  at date 1, implying  that c22B=WI2BR  + W22B.
Motivated  by costs  of financial  intermediation,  I will characterize  the smallest  scale of the banking
system  that will deliver the optimal  type-contingent  consumption. This implies  the largest  direct holding
and the smallest  intermediated  holding  of assets.  Until section  4, I only analyze  the optimal  quantities  of
total claims, W,  held by each agent. In section  4, the determination  of direct and bank claims is
reintroduced.
2.2  Secondary Market Prices
Let b, denote  that price at which a one unit claim  on date-2 consumption  trades for on date 1. Price
formation  is very simple:  those who  are type 1 have no use for future  consumption,  and will sell claims on
date-2 goods  at any positive  price. Type 2A agents  will buy date-2 maturing  assets  with date-  I claims, at
any price b,:  I/R (which allows  a yield of at least R). Type 2A agents  would sell date-I claims to buy date-
I claims  to invest  if b,>  I  /R. Type  2B agents  do not participate  in the date-I secondary  market. The market
clearing  condition  is that the supply  of long-term  assets by type I agents  equal  the demand  by type 2A
agents. The supply  of long-term  assets  for sale at date I (given b,>O)  is q,W 21+m 2. The  demand  on date I
for assets  with date-2  payoffs  (the supply  of assets  with date-I payoffs)  is q2AW12A+m 1, so long as b i  I  .
The market  clearing  price is then given  by  b  .m  I  q21 W12A  *  ml  This implies  that ct,e  the
R  q,W21 *  M
consumption in period  t of a type re{  1,2A,2B}  of agent is as follows:
10Cm, . W 1 2 .W
C 22A 9 - *W22A
C2  - W12 R  W22
2.3  Incentive Compatibility
The type-contingent  consumption  offered  on date-  I is incentive-compatible  if and only if no
investor  prefers the consumption  implied  by the claims  W,, intended  for another  type of investor. Let c
denote  the consumption  on date t of a type s investor  who misrepresents  himself  or herself  as a type s
investor,  choosing  the claims wl,w,w and trading at the market  price b, if oftype I or 2A.  Using  this
definition,  and the definitions  of individual  consumption,  c,  given  above,  the following  are the date-  I
constraints  on incentive-compatible  consumption,  (IC  S,T).
Date I incentive-compatibility  constraints:
2A
C 11 *W 1 1 W  blW21 2  WI2A  * blW 22A *  Cu  l  - C22Ab,  (IC  1,2A)
23
Ci-  *  W,,  *  blW21 2  W12B . blW22B *  C,l  - C22Bb,  (IC  1,2B)
C2U  - I 2A  W22A  2  ,  b  _  w21  a  _2  b_  (IC  2A,1)
W 12A  W, 3 23
*  12A  WM  2  -in  W2  *  C22  2  C228  (IC  2A,2B)
C22  - Wl2BR  *  W22  2  W 1 1R - W 21  *  C22  (IC  2B,1)
2A
C2  - W2 3R  *  W2=  2  W,2AR  . WM  *  C2A  (IC  2B.2A)
The constraints  (IC 1,2A)  and (IC 2A,l) together  imply  thatc,, . c=Ab,  and that b, - c.  If the relative
price on date 2 consumption  in terms of date I consumption  were not equal to  " , either type I or type 2A
would prefer  to take and then sell  the claim  withdrawn  by the other type of investor,  because  the date-I
market value of the claims would  differ. The market value of the amount  withdrawn  by type I investors
must equal  that of type 2A investors,  -therwise  both will take the one with higher  market value,  and trade to
get higher  consumption  on the desired  date.  This implies  that type 1 and 2A are indifferent  between  taking
the claims intended  for either of the two types, and that the mechanism  can give the same  claims to both
types and set W11 =W2A  and W21=W2.  Making  the claims given  to types I and 2A identical  loosens  the
constraints  (IC 2B, 1) and (IC 2B, 2A) that type  2B agents  do not select the claims intended  for other types,
by minimizing  max{W,,,  WL2A).  The date-  I incentive  constraints  (IC t,c) can be satisfied  several  ways,
11discussed  later. 3
Note that if c2A> c2,  some date-  I claims must be held by type 2A agents  (Wl2A>O),  and this implies  that
there must be trade to allow  type 2A  to consume  at date 2 and not on date 1.
2.4  Voluntary Deposits at Date 0
The constraints  that limit the amount  of liquidity  that can be provided  are the date-O  constraints  on
voluntary  deposits into  the mechanism  (usually  referred  to as participation  constraints,  but this could  be
confused  with participation  in markets). For investors  to choose  to deposit  in the bank requires  that the bank
give  them a type-contingent  consumption  bundle  that is as desirable  as what can be obtained  from  joining no
bank and just holding  assets directly  or by choosing  to deposit  in another  bank. The binding  constraint  is
that the bank must not allow  another  bank to offer a dominating  contract. Discussion  of the possibility  of
selecting  individual  direct investment  follows.
Individuals  can form alternative  mechanisms  ("competing  banks")  at date-O,  subject  to the same
incentive  and resource  constraints  as the mechanism  analyzed  above,  and with access  to the same
anonymous  market at date-i. This ability  imposes  coalition  incentive-compatibility  constraints. The
importance  of coalition  incentive  constraints  in this setting  was suggested  by Jacklin [1987]  who studies the
effects of ex-post, i.e.,  date l, coalition  formation  by trade in markets. Their importance  was further
clarified  by von Thadden  [1991]  who looks  at the implications  of ex-ante  coalition  formation,  where
competing  banks are formed.
2.4.1  Competing Banks on Date 0
Suppose  that at date 0, a competing  bank contract  can be proposed  by "Bank II."  Bank II accepts
deposits  at date 0 and offers date I and date 2 type-contingent  payments,  and a portfolio  policy.  A contract
offered  by Bank I is date-0 coalition  incentive  compatible  if no dominating  contract  can be proposed  on date
O  by Bank II. A contract  offered  by Bank II can offer its members  claims on date-  I and date-2  consumption
that its type 1 or type 2A members  can use to trade on date-I in the anonymous  market  that includes
members  of Bank I.  Suppose  that Bank I proposes  a contr,.ct  that, if no competing  contract  were proposed,
would lead  to type-contingent  consumptions(c  ' 1 ,c, ,cLc 2 ,)  with  !  'x*  If no competing  contract  is
proposed,  then b,, the date-I price of date-2  claims, will be high: b 1' - -c">x  This allows  Bank II to
3If the date-I incentive  constraints  were the only constraints,  it would  be incentive  feasible  to
treat types 2A and 2B identically,  despite  the ability  of types I and 2A to trade. For example,  set W 1,=c,,
and W 21=O. Then c22A =c22B2RcII  can be implemented  by setting  W21=WI2A=W2B=O,  and WnA=  W22B=
c=AkRcI 1. This implies a date-I price of bI=cI 1/cm<l/R, and self-selection  by all types. Proposition  2
shows  that, at the optimum,  cm2:c22B2tRcII  even  when the date-I incentive  constraints  are not imposed.
12propose  a dominating  contract. Suppose  that Bank II proposes  a contract  that gives  the same cm as Bank I
(c2= . ci,2;  but invests  more of the remaining  capital in long-term  assets (and less in short-term)  to give
types I and 2A tradable  claims slightly  biased  toward date 2 consumption. Investing  one unit  more in long
term assets and one less in short-term  claims allows an R decrease  in date-I and a X unit increase  in date-2
I  I
claims. Choose e>O  such that w,,.w,nw,  .'  o  -ad  wW.w2  w2  - -xsuch  that
X  q.W1 C 1
This implies  that:
~  ~  aX L  ______  q~cflp  aXcc 1 n q,c zt  e  2C2s*x  l  l  2^22A  eX  Ac  l 
Cli  - - C  _  .- w  . - C  *  *-.
ql*q2A  ql*q2A  R  ql-q2A  ql-q2A  R  c2s
*  s  C  1)  >  C
C22A2
Similarly,  for type 2A agents:
. qlCIt  l  q~c~2OA  gX  qlc 1 l  C2  q2 4 cL  gX
ClA.'  --  C  _  --. _  - ,C *  .
q1.q2s  b,  q*lq2A  R  q1  ql-  q2A  R
III
A  C  (--1)  >  CA
cR
Trade  with members  of bank I at price b,Iwould  allow members  of bank II to get date I
consumption  at date-O  cost (b1'X)-'<(l/R) which is less than the actual date-O  cost of date I consumption. If
the price ratio, b,, of date 1 to date 2 consumption  is not in line with marginal  productivity,  R/X, a
competing  bank can offer a dominating  contract. A symmetric  argument  rules out b,<R/X. If, and only if,
b,=R/X,  is there no dominating  contract  possible  for a competing  bank.
I assume that interbank  deposits are identifiable  as such  (if only by their size).  This prevents  a
competing  bank from obtaining  the liquidity  creation  of other  banks by investing  directly  in the one-period
deposits  of the banks. 5 Note that, in practice,  the interest  rate on interbank  deposits is sometimes  below  the
4As an alternative  to increasing  W 21, bank II could  directly  sell long-term  assets  at date 1,
increasing  m2 by eX/R.
5  If interbank  deposits  could  not be identified,  an argument  similar  to the above  shows  that not
only must bl=R/X,  but WI must also equal R and W2=X. This would mean  not only cli/cnA=R/X,  but
also c,1=R,  c224=c2=X-
13rate offered  to depositors  with similar  maturity. Some benefits  of liquidity  creation  can be focused on the
individual  bank's depositors. However,  the effect of banks' liquidity  creation  on market liquidity  is
available  to all competitors,  due to free-entiy  into trades  in the anonymous  secondary  market.
The  possibility  of entry  by competing  banks implies  that the amount  of liquidity  provided  by
financial  markets is the amount  offered  by the physical  productivity  of short-term  productive  assets,  which
is more liquidity  than markets  offer when there are no banks.
2.5  Incentives  for Excess Direct Holdings by Individuals
The individual  incentive  to join the financial  institution  is assured  by the coalition  incentive
constraint  that competing  banks  cannot offer dominating  contracts  at date 0, which implies that
b,  C1l  - R . If the individual  at date-0 does not deposit  any capital in the bank, then he or she will hold a
C22A  X
portfolio  of long and short-term  assets (a fraction  a e[O,1]  in short-term,  and  -a in long-term).  The type-
contingent  consumption  from holding  assets directly  is for 1: aR + (I-a)b,X=R (for all a), type 2A:
aR/b1+(l-a)X=X (for all a), type 2B: mR 2 + (I-X)X s X (equal  to X for a=l).  These consumption  levels
can be offered  by the bank, and the bank offers consumption  levels  that are most preferred  on date 0. Unless
6=1,  the bank has a strictly better set of consumption  opportunities  from which to choose. Investors  will not
choose to deviate  to holding  all of their assets directly.
An even stronger  individual  participation  constraint  is satisfied. Individual  investors  can freely
choose  at date 0 to deposit  any fraction  of their capital in the bank, and each will choose  the correct fraction
to deposit  if the bank offers the optimal  consumption  allocations. This is discussed  below in section  4,
where the allocation  of investor  wealth  between  direct holdings  and bank claims is discussed.
3.  The Optimal  Amount  of Liquidity
The banking  system creates  more liquidity  than there would  be without  a banking  system or
secondary  markets. The banking  system also makes  the secondary  market more liquid:  secondary  markets
will offer the amount  of liquidity  implied  by the short-term  physical  return  on capital. The condition  for
banks  to create  more liquidity  than secondary  markets is that not too many investors  participate  in the
secondary  market.  Proposition  I states  this result.
Proposition 1: If  there is limited  participation  in the secondary  market  (q 2B>O), then banks hold  the
physical  short-term  liquid assets  and increase  the liquidity  of the secondary  market until  the price
of long-term  assets  on date 1 is b,= R . If the coefficient  of relative  risk aversion  is above one,  and
x
a sufficient  fraction  of investors  may not participate,  q3,,>4>o,then  banks  provide  more liquidity
14than  does  the  secondary  market,  and  set  c, 1 > R and  C22B<X.
The next proposition  shows  the effect of increased  secondary  market liquidity  (increased  q2) on the
amount  of liquidity  created  by banks.
Proposition  2:  Increasing  individual  participation  in the secondary  market  (increasing  q2A  by
reducing  q2,)  weakly  reduces  the liquidity  that banks  create relative  to secondary  markets  (c,,-R),
and reduces  cl,, the amount  of liquidity  available  to investors.
Proofs:  See Appendix.
Banks produce  less liquidity  when more investors  participate  in the secondary  market because  more
of the benefit from a higher short-term  return  goes to those who profit from trading  (and have  high
consumption)  rather  than to those who need  short-term  liquidity  for unexpected  consumption  purposes  (and
have low consumption).  In equilibrium,  increased  participation  in the market  reduces  the consumption  of
those who  need liquidity  (reducing  c 1,) and those who trade actively  (reducing  CMA). The consumption  of
those who do not need liquidity  and do not participate  in the secondary  market  can increase  or decrease  (c228
can rise or fall), but C 22B - cl rises as participation  increases:  there is less risk-sharing  between  those who
turn out to need liquidity  and those who do not participate  in secondary  markets.
4.  Direct Holdings and Bank Claims
Not all of the financial  claims  need to be held by banks at date 0 for them to augment  the liquidity
available  to investors. If there are variable  costs associated  with running  wealth  though intermediaries,  the
scale of the banking  sector  is determined  by the minimum  scale  of banks  that is needed  to implement  the
desired  amount  of liquidity. The scope for direct holdings  arises because  the set of optimal  tradable  claims
held by investors  at date 1 (before  trade) assigns  a positive  claim  on date-2  consumption  to all types ( W 2 ,i.
amin{W 2,, W22A,  W 22B}>O).  This implies  one constraint  on direct holding:  d2sW2,,,, the total type-
contingent  holdings  of date-2  on date-  I are then W 2,=d 2+w 2v, where wt, is the type-contingent  holding  of
date t claims on the bank selected  by type r.  Investors  who are of type 2B (and do not to participate  in
markets)  hold no maturing  short-term  physical  assWts  at date I (W12B=O), to avoid  inefficient  rollover  of
short-term  assets. This implies  that all short-term  claims are bank liabilities. Because  all date-  I claims are
bank liabilities,  this implies W 1,=w,,.  Subject  to the choice of bank claims being  incentive-compatible,
liquidity  can be provided  by all investors  investing  directly  at date 0 a fraction-d of their wealth into long- x
term assets. 6 .
6This  shows  that the optimal  mechanism  can assign a specified  fraction  direct holdings in return
for allowing  access  to banks. I show below  that the optimal  mechanism  can allow investors  at date 0 to
freely  choose the proportions  of direct and intermediated  investment.
154.1  The Scale of the Banking Sector
This section  analyzes  the minimum  fraction, p,  of assets invested  through  banks. There are several
constraints  on p. The banking  system  must hold all of the physical  short-term  assets. Otherwise,  type 2B's,
who do not participate  at date I, will inefficiently  rollover  short-term  assets. For  date-  I consumption  to
equal  cll, short  term assets  with a date-I value of at least q 1cl,  must be held, implying  that at least a fraction
A  2  p.  q,c,1 (Minimum  holding  of Liquidity)
R
of date-I maturing assets must be held by banks at date 0.
4.1.1  Incentive Compatibility
Investors  hold no date-  I claims directly  on date 0.  Each invests p in banks, and I  - p directly  in
long term date-2  assets implying  that on date-I (before  trade) each holds a date-2 direct claim of d2=(l - p)X.
The constraint  that entry  by a competing  bank not be profitable  implies  C22A = c, 2 (X/R)=  cll/bl. This implies
that and that the only potentially  binding  incentive  constraint  on date I withdrawals  from banks is that type
2B's select  the proper  withdrawal  and that, at the optimum,  the type 2A and type I withdrawals  are equally
attractive  to type 2B agents.  To avoid inefficient  rollover  of short-term  assets,  type 2B agents  will have no
date-I maturing  claims:  W12s=O, implying  they  take no date-I maturing  bank claims:  w, 2B=O. The constraint
that 2B agents  not select 2A claims is:
CmB  '  W22(I-P)X  2  w12AR * wnA-  (I-P)X  - c2A  (IC  2B,2A)
'(C22-  (1-p)X-wnA)-R  *  (I-p)X  . w22.
x
The smallest  possible  fraction of assets held by banks, p, is achieved  by setting a contract  where
those with access  to the market continue  to hold no bank claims after date I and W22A=0=w 21. Noting that
cn=c,,YX/R,  the constraint  on type 2B consumption  is C22B  - (0-p)X  2 R(cj1-(l-p)R)  or:
p  2pC  *  1-  ~X-R  2  IC: Incentive  compatibility
The analysis  shows  that c2,-Rcl 1 increases  as market liquidity  increases  (q2A  increases),  and reaches
a maximum  of X-R 2 when  q2A=I-qj. The value of Pc decreases  to zero as q2A  increases  to l-q,.  This
implies  that as the market becomes  very liquid,  the IC constraint  does not bind, because pjc-.0.This  implies
that when  the market  becomes  very liquid,  the banking  system does not hold long-term  assets.  Given
sufficient  risk aversion,c2W-Rc  I is sufficiently  large at low levels of liquidity  that pic>pi,  and as the market
16becomes  illiquid,  the fraction  of long-term  assets  held by the banking  system, Pic  - p,,  increases. The long-
term assets held  by individuals  provide  them with liquidity  because  they can either sell them to banks in the
secondary  market,  or borrow  from banks, using  them as collateral. In this view of banks' liquidity  role,  the
bank provides  liquidity  by offering  liquid deposits  and by making long-term  assets more  liquid,  through the
increase in market liquidity.
The ability for investors  to choose  to deposit  part of their endowment  in the bank (and hold the rest
directly  in long-term  assets),  does not change  the set of feasible  final consumption  possibilities.  So long as
p2  plc,  the bank will offer contracts  where w-,=wi2A  s w22BR.  No matter  what fraction  an individual  investor
allocates  to the bank, it is incentive-compatible  for that investor  when of types 1 and 2A to withdraw
wlI-wU 2A at date I and when of type 2B to withdraw  W22B  at date 2.  Deviating  to a smaller  or larger value
of p leaves  CII/C22A  unchanged,  which leaves  the market  price of date 2 consumption  on date 1, b 1,
unchanged. Holding  the correct fraction 1- p in long-term  assets  directly leads  to the type-contingent
consumption  from the optimal  mechanism. Choosing  another level of p allows  the individual  to obtain a
level of type-contingent  consumption  that would be feasible  and incentive  compatible:  too high a p reduces
c,, and c22A,  increasing  C22B, too low a p does the reverse. If the banking  system offers claims  that are
consistent  with the optimal  levels of c,,, then each individual  will choose the correct  bank deposit, p. 7
The constraints  on minimum  banking  system  market share in this section  are based only on the
constraint  that investors  choose  the proper withdrawal. In addition,  there are resource  constraints
represented  by the market-clearing  condition  (definition  of b,).  If bank's ability  to trade in markets  is
limited similar  to individuals,  then resource  constrains  imply  that banks  may need  to hold more assets  than
the constraints  above imply. This is analyzed  in the next section.
4.2  Scale of the Banking Sector and Banks' Ability To Trade Assets
To determine  the link  between  bank trades in the market and the implied  scale of the banking  sector,
begin  with the benchmark  where banks  do not trade in the financial  market, and ml=m2 =0. If the bank
makes  no trades,  the resource  constraint  implies  that banks  must hold sufficient  assets is to provide  type 1
agents  with consumption c,1, plus provide  enough  date-2 assets  to provide  the excess of type 2B's
consumption  over that of obtained  frnm their direct holdings  of assets. All investors  will choose  the same
direct holding  on date 0, when their liquidity  need  and type is unknown. The consumption  of type 2A
'If individuals  differ  in their amount  by which  they relative  risk aversion  exceeds  one, they could
choose individualized  amounts  of liquidity  by selecting  different levels  of p. So long as the date-I
incentive  compatibility  constraint  is satisfied,  no other  agent's feasible  set is influenced  by another's
choice of p.
17agents  can come from direct holdings  of date-2  claims by type I and 2A agents. Because  type 2A
consumption  is cuA=c,,X/R,  the value of direct holding  is: d2=qhAc, 1X/(q 1+q2A)R.  This implies  that the
balance  of date-O  capital is invested  by the bank, and the scale of the banking  sector  must satisfy:
p  aPR  . q2 A11  (MC = Market Clearing, investors only)
assuming  that this satisfies PMck  Pi.  PMC2p,,  because  the market clearing  condition  requires  that all liquid
assets be held by the bank, as well as some long term assets  (because c,,AR). If the bank cannot  trade
assets,  the scale of the banking  industry  is max{PMc,PIc}.  The value of PMC  decreases  with increased  market
participation,  and PMc  goes from I to q, as q2A  goes from 0 to l-q,.
If a bank's access  to the market is not superior  to type 2B individuals,  it cannot  buy date-2 assets
with date-  I claims on date 1. This limited  market  access  would imply  that m,=O  and m 220.  If the bank were
to sell date-2  assets (to type 2A agents)  on date-  I, setting m2>0,  it would  need  to hold more than PMC  assets
at date-0, increasing  the scale of the bank. Alternatively,  if the bank did not have limited  access  to markets,
it could buy date-2  assets on date-I with date-I claims, and set m1>O  and m2=0. In this case, it could  hold
fewer assets on date-O,  because  it would not need  to fund the consumption  of type 2B agents  in excess of
their direct holdings. The resource  constraint  implied  by market clearing  implies  that the scale of the bank
on date-O is  PMc  - m,/R.
By buying long-term  assets  on date 1, or equivalently,  lending  against  them at market  rates, the bank could
shrink until pMC  - m,/R is equal  to to the smaller of pic  and p 1. If the bank can participate  on behalf  of type
2B's, it can set ml>O,  and operate at a smaller scale.
In summary,  whether  or not the bank can participate  in markets  on behalf of investors,  the banking
sector  shrinks  as financial  market participation  increases  and markets  become  more liquid. There are other
interesting  interpretations  of these results. Because  the banking  system  issues  the short-term  financial
assets, its scale is a measure  of the proportion  of short-term  financial  assets in the economy. Whenever  the
scale of the banking  sector  exceeds  that implied  by the minimal  liquidity  needs of the economy  (its scale
exceeds p1..  q
52'),  then the banks hold long-term assets as well.  Proposition 3 summarizes the results in
R
section  4.
Proposition 3  The scale  of the banking  sector, the fraction of financial assets  that are short-term,
the fraction of real assets  that are short term, and the gap between the maturity of financial and
real assets  all decrease  as direct market participation increases  (q2A  increases,  while q2.
decreases).
185.  Example to Illustrate Results on Debt Maturity and Scale of Banidng Industry
This example  will illustrate  the model's implications,  focusing  on the results about  the aggregate
maturity  of financial  and physical  assets in economies  with various levels  of market liquidity. Suppose  that
the physical  assets are as follows:  If one invests $1 at date 0, the liquid  short-term  yields R=$1  at date 1
(similarly  between  dates 1 and 2). Investing  $1 in the long-term  asset yields X=$2  at date 2.  The
coalition  incentive-compatibility  constraint  of no dominating  competing  bank implies  that the date-I price
of a unit claim  on date-2 is b,='/2,  and a claim on X=2  at date-2  sells for 1 on date 1.
There are 100  investors,  20 will be of type 1 (and consume  at date 1), and 80 will be of type 2 (and
consume  at date 2).  Each begins  with $1 to invest  on date 0. It is not known  which investors  will be of
each type. As of date 0, each investor  has a probability  q,=.2 of being  of needing  to withdraw  and thus
being  of type l.  A fraction .8 of investors  will be of either of type 2A or 2B.  Assume  that investors  have
constant relative risk aversion, with relative rate of risk aversion, -cU"(c)/U'(c)=2;  let U[c] = 110  -.00  , to
C
keep  numbers  round. Constant  relative  risk aversion  of 2 allows  the model  to be solved in closed  form.
Consider  the case where  there is no one is active  in the financial  market, and no investor  is of type
2A. Suppose  that the bank does not cross-subsidize  investors,  and invests  at date 0 a fraction .2 in date-  1
maturing  assets and .8 in date-2  maturing  assets.  This yields  c,,=1 or C 22B=2,  and date 0 expected  utility
equals
.2[110  -1  *  .8[110  - l00  - 50.
1  2
This amount  of liquidity  is not possible  without  banics  when no one participates  in the secondary  market. If
each investor  put a fraction a of date-0  wealth into short-term  assets  and the remainder  in long-term,  each
would  consume  c,1= al, c22,=(l-£)2,  and any feasible  direct holdings imply  c,,=0 when C22B=2  or imply
c22B=O  when cl,=1. When  there are no markets,  banks liquidity  role is important  even when there is no
cross-subsidization.  Cross-subsidization,  however,  is also desirable.
There exists a more liquid asset that each investor  would  prefer. The ex-ante optimum  type
19contingent  consumption  is c,1=1.306  and  C22B=1.847, when q2A=0  (see table 1 below). These  consumption
levels  lead to expected  utility  of:  .2U(1.306)  + .8U(1.847),  or
.2[110  306]  .8[110  - l  I - 51.3  >  50.
1.306  1.347
The investors  prefer  this more liquid  asset.
5.1  A bank can provide this liquidity through demand deposits.
Suppose  that each investor  invests  exclusively  though that bank at date 0. The bank pays 1.306  to
those who withdraw  at date 1,  and pays 1.847  to those who withdraw  at date 2. The  bank receives  $100 in
deposits  as of date 0, and invests a fraction close  to .26 in short-term  assets(26  short-term), .74 in long-
term assets (74 long term).  At date 1, the bank's  maturing  assets are worth  26, 20 type I depositors
withdraw,  allowing  each to get 26/20=1.306.  There remain 74 long-terrn  assets at date 2, when they will
be worth X=2  each. If on that date, there remain 80 depositors,  each will receive: (  74 *  2) / 80 =  1.847.
The bank's cross subsidization  of investors  leads  to a more  liquid deposit. The bank invests  in a portfolio
with 74% long-termn  physical  assets,  and issues 100%  short-term  liabilities  that can be withdrawn  at date 1.
Intermediaries  create liquidity  by offering  short-term  financial  assets  which allow the tradeoff  of liquidity
against expected  return,  implicitly  allowing  insurance,  where those who turn out to be type 2B investors
subsidize  type 1 investors.
There is no role for markets in this liquidity creation.  The bank need not use the secondary
market  to get liquidity,  because  the individual  uncertainty  about  how much liquidity  is needed is diversified
away by dealing with many  depositors. In addition,  if a  perfectly liquid  secondary  market exists,  then there
is no scope for creating  liquidity  by asset management  (the cross-subsidy  just described),  as shown  by
Jacklin [1987]. If banks  tried to cross-subsidize,  all investors  would prefer  to hold assets directly.
To see the effect of a competing  perfectly  liquid  market, suppose  that all of the 80 type 2 investors
participate  in a competitive  secondary  market at date 1; all are of type 2A and there are no type 2B
20investors. If the bank offers more  than I to those who withdraw  at date 1,  then no one would  choose to
invest in the bank at date 0. The date I secondary  market  price of a claim  on 2 units of date 2 consumption
will exceed  what the bank offers, if investors  deposit  in the bank. In the example  where  the bank offers
1.306  at date 1, each type 2 investor  who deposits in the bank will be able to withdraw 1.306  at date 1, or
1.847  at date 2. Any investor  who holds long-term  claims  directly  will own a claim on 2 units of date 2
consumption,  which he can consume  at date 2 if of type 2, and will be able to sell it to a type 2A who
deposits in the bank for at least 1.306  if of type 1. Only if cl =I and czA=2,  will investors  (or competing
banks) choose  to hold claims that mature on both dates.  A perfectly liquid secondary  market implies  that
banks are not needed  to fill in for limited  liquidity  of markets and
21Table 1: Optimal Final Consumption Levels as Market Liquidity Changes
q,=.2,  q 2 B=l-qj-qA 
q2A (Rate  Of  cll  C22A  C22B  C22BRC1
participation in
secondary  market)
0.00  1.306019  2.612038  1.84699  0.54097
(not relevant)
0.05  1.236068  2.472136  1.84262  0.60655
0.10  1.187342  2.374684  1.83942  0.65208
0.15  1.151383  2.302766  1.83697  0.68559
0.20  1.123724  2.247448  1.83503  0.71131
0.25  1.101773  2.203546  1.83346  0.73169
0.30  1.08392  2.16784  1.83216  0.74824
0.35  1.069111  2.138222  1.83106  0.76195
0.40  1.056624  2.113248  1.83013  0.77350
0.45  1.045953  2.091906  1.82932  0.78337
0.50  1.036726  2.073452  1.82861  0.79189
0.55  1.028668  2.057336  1.82799  0.79932
0.60  1.02157  2.04314  1.82744  0.80587
0.65  1.015269  2.030538  1.82695  0.81168
0.70  1.009639  2.019278  1.82650  0.81687
0.75  1.004576  2.009152  1.82611  0.82153
0.79  1.00088  2.00176  1.82576  0.82488
also that banks cannot cross-subsidize investors.  When all investors participate in the market, the amount of
liquidity is independent of the activities of the banking system.
5.2  Illiquid Secondary Markets: Limited Participation
22Suppose  that only a fraction  of type 2 investors  (who  are without  a need to trade for consumption)
participate  in the secondary  market. I continue  to assume  that the probability  of being  type 1 is ql=.2.
Assume  that the probability  of being of type 2A and participating  in the market is qcA=.3.  The probability
of being  type 2B (and not participating)  is q2B=.5. The optimal  incentive-compatible  final consumption
levels  of each type of investor  as the liquidity  of the secondary  market  changes  are given in Table 1 (higher
q2A  implies  a more liquid  market).
I now show how bank deposit  contracts  work  for the case where q2A=.3,  q2B=.5.  A deposit  contract
is one where  the holder deposits psi at date 0, and then can withdraw  r,=w,  =wl2A at date 1, or r2=w=B  at
date 2. The bank deposit  is short-term,  because  the investor  can  withdraw  at date-I without  selling it in the
market. Each investor  invests  directly  a fraction 1- p of date-0  wealth.
In the case where the bank can buy long-term  assets on date 1 on the same  terms as those who
participate  in the market at that date (and sell short-term  claims  to buy long-term  at date 1, setting  m,>O),
the incentive  constraint  that type 2B's not withdraw  from the bank at date 1 (r2kRrl) is binding,  and the size
of the banking  section is p 1 c=.25176. Each investor  on date 0 holds a fraction .25176  of his portfolio  as bank
deposits. Withdrawing  on date 1 or on date 2 yields r,=r2=.33568. Each investor  on date 0 also holds  a
fraction .7482  of his portfolio  as long-term  assets  directly,  and these are worth .7482 on date 1 or 1.4964  on
date 2.  The bank invests the .25176  (per capita)  as follows:  it holds qlcl,=.21678  in short-term  assets  and
holds p-q 1c,j=.25176-.21678=.03498  in long-term  assets.
The date-I market  works as follows. Market  clearing  on date-I requires  that the date-I value of
long-term  claims supplied,  q,(1  -p)X(R/X),  equal  the date-  I value of short-term  claims offered  to buy them,
qcArl+m,  or that mi, the bank's sale of short-term  assets  on date-I, equal qj(l-A)R-q2Ar,=  0.489. The bank
sells 0.489 date-I claims  to buy .978 in date-2  assets sold by type 1 agents  (or makes  loans against  that
many  date-2 assets at market rates).
Under  the assumption  that banks have  no informational  advantage  in participating  in markets,  the
size of the banking  sector  must be larger:  when q2A  is .3, the fraction of wealth invested  through banks, p,equals pmc-  0.34965. The bank must hold more long-term  assets  to reduce  the supply  offered  for sale  by
individuals  to the amount  that will be purchased  by type 2A investors  who  participate  in the secondary
market. Some  of the demand  for liquidity  must be diverted  from the secondary  market. With  no bank trade,
each investor  invests .65035  directly  in long-term  assets at date 0, and as a result  directly holds  a claim
worth 1.3007=2(.65035)  if held until date-2. Each investor  deposits .34965  in short-term  deposits  issued  by
the bank, and accepts a deposit  contract  with that returns r,=.43357  if withdrawn  at date-  I or r2=.53146,  if
held until date 2.
The market clears  at date I without  any trade from the bank. The date-I value of long-term  assets
supplied  is ql(l -p)X(R/X)=0.  13007,  and the date-  I value of maturing  assets  offered in exchange  is
q2Arj=O.13007.  More details of this example  are in Appendix  II.
Table 2: Scale of the banking industry.  If banks participate  in the secondary  market,  the scale is the larger
of the value  in the column  Incentive  Compatibility  or Enough  Liquidity. If banks do not participate  in the
secondary  market,  the scale  of that given  in the column  titled Market  Clearing  with investors  only.
Incentive  Market  clearing,  with
l Compatibility  Enough liquidity  investors only
PE-  im-R"l  p  qpu±  ~  I  - ____
_12A  X_  _  _  R'_  R(qX.q  )
0.00  0.45903  0.26120  1.00000
0.05  0.39345  0.24721  0.75279
0.10  0.34792  0.23747  0.60422
0.15  0.31441  0.23028  0.50655
0.20  0.28869  0.22474  0.43814
0.25  0.26831  0.22035  0.38790
i030  i  0 25 176.  0.21678  i  0.34965
0.35  0.23805  0.21382  0.31966
0.40  0.22650  0.21132  0.29558
0.45  0.21663  0.20919  0.27588
0.50  0.20811  0.20735  0.25948
0.55  0.20068  0.20573  0.24564
0.60  0.19413  0.20431  0.23382
0.65  0.18832  0.20305  0.22362
0.70  0.18313  0.20193  0.21473
0.75  0.17847  0.20092  0.20691
24Incentive  Market  clearing,  with
Compatibility  Enough  liquidity investors  only
0.79  0.17512  0.20018  0.20132
0.80  0.00000  0.20000  0.20000
Italics indicate  that the p constraint  is not binding,  bold indicates a p constraint that is binding.
The financial  assets have shorter  maturity  than the physical  assets in the economy  whenever  the
bank invests  partly in long-term  assets, because  the bank offers short-term  deposits. The bank always
invests  in long-term  assets when banks  do not participate  in secondary  markets  and also when the Incentive
Compatibility  constraint  is binding  and p 1< p,c.
In the case where banks  can trade in secondary  markets,  Table 2 show the bank investment  in long-
term assets  (per capita),  the fraction of the economies  financial  assets which  are short-term,  the fraction  of
the economies  real assets  which are short-term. As the market becomes  more liquid,  the market share of the
bank falls, the average  maturity  of financial  and real assets  rises, and the gap between  the maturity  of
financial  assets and physical  assets falls.
Table  3:  The  effects  of increased  market  liquidity  (higher  q2A is a more  liquid  market).
q2A:  Fraction  of per-
participation  capita wealth  that  Fraction  of real  Fraction  of financial  Gap between  fraction  of
rate (.8 is full banks invest long-  investment  which  assets which are short-  short-term  financial  assets
participation)  term  is short-term  term  and short-term  real assets
0  0.19783  0.26120  0.45903  0.19783
0.05  0.14623  0.24721  0.39345  0.14623
0.1  0.11045  0.23747  0.34792  0.11045
0.15  0.08413  0.23028  0.31441  0.08413
0.2  0.06395  0.22474  0.28869  0.06395
0.25  0.04796  0.22035  0.26831  0.04796
0.35  0.02423  0.21382  0.23805  0.02423
0.4  0.01517  0.21132  0.22650  0.01517
0.45  0.00744  0.20919  0.21663  0.00744
0.5  0.00077  0.20735  0.20811  0.00077
0.55  0.00000  0.20573  0.205731  0.00000
250.6  0.00000  0.20431  0.20431  0.00000
0.65  0.00000  0.20305  0.20305  0.00000
0.7  0.00000  0.20193  0.20193  0.00000
0.75  0.00000  0.20092  0.20092  0.00000
0.79  0.00000  0.20018  0.20018  0.00000
0.8  0.00000  0.20000  0.20000  0.00000
As the market becomes  more liquid,  the maturity  of debt increases, and the market share of banks
falls (this can also be interpreted  as value of the equity  market representing  an increased  share of wealth).
This example  can also demonstrate  the importance  of a sufficiently  large financial  intermediary
sector  when there are illiquid  financial  markets. The banking-system  allows  consumption  allocations  that
dominate  those with assets held directly. For example,  with q2A=. 3 and q 2B=.5,  the optimal  allocations  yield
c,,=1.08392. To achieve  this level of consumption  on date I by type I investors,  with banks' market share
equal  zero, and all assets  held directly,  each investor  must invest  a fraction .4336 in short-term  assets at
date-0. The banking  system only invests q,(  1  .08392)=.21678  in liquid assets,  economizing  on liquidity.
The outcome  with a zero bank market  share and a fraction .4336  of each investor's  portfolio  in short-term
assets  at date-0 is the following  triple of consumption  levels:  cl,=1.0872,  c2 A=1.889  (below  that with
banks,  2.1  784),  and c228  = 1.567  (below  that with banks, 1.83216).
6.  Conclusion
With limited  participation  in markets,  the banking  system  creates liquidity  in two ways. Banks fill
the liquidity  gap in markets  by diverting  demand  for liquidity  from markets. This improves  the market's
liquidity,  increasing  the price  of illiquid  assets, b,, to RIX  (which is in excess of what it is when all assets
are held directly). If investors  are suffici-ntly  risk averse  and enough do not participate  in markets,  there is
also direct liquidity  creation,  with banks providing  a cross-subsidy  to those who  withdraw  early (financed
by those  who do not withdraw  early).
The clearest  application  of the model is to the understanding  of financial  development  in developing
economies. Limited  liquidity  of secondary  markets  implies  that the maturity  structure  of financial  claims
26will adjust  to fill the gap by allowing  individuals  to hold self-liquidating  claims. As the financial  markets
develop  one should  expect  to see increased  use of longer-term  claims such as long-term  debt  or equity. The
analysis  implies  that there will be a  small supply  of long-term  direct claims in economies  where few
participate  in financial  markets. The banking  system  will have  a large role in the allocation  of capital and
the provision  of liquidity. This analysis  abstracts  from important  problems  with enforcement  of property
rights over collateral  and other  bankruptcy/enforcement  issues  that are also present  in many  developing
countries.
More liquid  markets  lead to less liquidity  creation  by banks,  a smaller  banking  sector,  and a longer
average  maturity  of financial  assets. More liquid markets  also lead to longer  maturity  physical investment,
and a smaller  gap between  the maturity  of financial  assets  and physical  investments. In addition,  as more
liquid  markets  force  the banking  system  to shrink,  the banks' holdings  of long-term  assets  (term loans) will
shrink more  rapidly  than it holdings of shorter-term  loans. Hoshi, Kashyap,  Scharfstein  [1990]  is an
empirical study  that documents  the effects  of market development  on banks and banks' structure.
Regulatory  changes opened  access  to the Japanese  bond market. The effects were broadly  in line with the
implications  of this model. Banks' market  share was reduced,  and banks' holdings  of long-term  assets fell
more rapidly  than did holdings  of short-tern assets.
The analysis  also has implications  for the effect of development  of the banking  sector on financial
markets. The model can easily  accommodate  costs of financial  intermediation  (for example  a proportional
cost of banks holding  assets),  but the analysis  is much  more complicated  with very few new insights. The
effects  of these costs can be seen by comparing  the case  where there are no intermediation  costs,  analyzed
here, with that where the costs are so large  that all assets  are held directly. When intermediation  costs are so
high at all assets are held directly,  each investor  invests  more in more liquid  assets, yet the consumption  of
those who need liquidity  (c,, 1) is lower,  and the secondary  market price of long-term  assets  (b,) is lower than
it is when  banks face low intermediation  costs.  Reduced  intermediation  costs make financial  markets  more
27liquid,  and lower the opportunity  cost of liquidity. In addition,  in the case  that banks can participate  in the
market,  the reduction  of intermediation  costs also increases  the volume  of trade in the financial  market.
Reduced  bank costs can increase  the volume  of trade even when banks  cannot access  the secondary  market,
because  the increased  holding  of long-term  assets  by individuals  due to the higher secondary  market prices
of long-term  assets. This suggests  that improvements  in banking,  through reduced  costs or less oppressive
regulation,  will be conducive  to the liquidity  of financial  markets  and to financial  market development.
Improvements  in access  to financial  markets  (increased  disclosure  and transparency)  which make the market
more liquid  will diminish  the role of banks,  but will also reduce  banks  costs if the improvements  provide
increased  bank access  to the market. This two-way  causality  suggests  that empirical  study of the roles of
banks  and markets  must use structural  information  to disentangle  the effects. The line of empirical  research
started by DemirgUc-Kunt  and Levine [1995]  on banks, markets,  and development  has documented  that
banks  and markets  tend to develop  together.  Future  work should  attempt  to disentangle  the conflicting
effects  of banks  and markets  on each other. The current  model of the link  between  liquidity  provided  by
financial  institutions  and liquidity  provided  by markets  is quite rudimentary,  but I hope that further
refinement  gives  more insight  into these issues  in financial  structure  and development.
28Appendix  I:
Proof of  Propo_tio  1:
Substting  in the  source consiit,  dhe  objective  fimct,  0,  becomes.
. q1U(cI,) - q2AU('  c  * q29U(  )
R  q2(
(1-  q,-  a2^. x R  R  q  R
At csR,  tbe resource cos  t  imps  lia  c  R  __R  . 2X  md  c2,OX.
U(c) is mm  risk eaese than log(c),  and U'(c) > Z U'(cZ) for Z>l, impbig  that
C 1 C 1 1
U,(c,J)>U'(c, X) X.  Risk  isiaon  mplies that U'(c,  X)X  >U'  q 1 R  qR  )X
R R  R R  2DR'
These two resuts imply  that 0'(c,,)>O  for c,,sR  Because 0(c,l)  is cont_ou  but not d  iable
atc1 CIR,thc opmal  value of c 11kR.
Th  fctiron  0  is cave:
(q1*q~~  *j~qt-2L  q2A- 1 )X 
R)  -U  E  < 0, bme  U'c$O.
Proof thM the  orght  derMvt  ast  c 11-R is negS&e, if q.  is  sao:
Set ctl.  Rfe, fur &>O.  Frm  qA- 1 -qI-q2A
a..
)  qtU  ~(R.e)qutRt  )XX  (  ;  '(~(l9^  R )X *'(R..e)-q,U'(k-e)  q2,U(-l.)-  X  -
IR  I-q,-q2A  R
(1-  q-A)1Lx
,tU'(R e)  q2AU'((1-  .)X)X  - (ql.q2)U'(  aR  )
a  l-qt-q?,  R
(ql-Sq2,  R  ]  qX XU (  eX'-))X-U'((X  (q,.q2d  6 X
l-q1-q2A  1  R CU-q,-q))
For my ftod  t>O (and  for a  sm-11 vale  of e),  wne  cm  choos  q  -I-qt 1-q>o  h 
qu X  I  ex  I  (q1-q2A)  e X
RfU ((X-R )-U((X-  (q-  )is  arbhm*y  _eggzvs  ;m puiculw.  Ion tha
-q,[U'(R.a)-U'((X. (qq  )eX)l  i  ng  that the ri*  daiewv  at c1t-R is nepti,
l-q,-q2  A
if q2e>0 is sufficiently  smal.
29By  a  imibr  yrgwat  ,  if  q2A is sufficiestly  smal,  ha  there  exists  e>O such  that
*'(R.e)>O,  md  because  O(cll)  is concave,  the  rght  derivative  at  c,,.R  is positive,  mnd the
otmal  value  of  c,,  exceeds R.
As to proposition  2, increasing  liquidity  implies  that more  type 2 agents participate,  and that q2B
decreases  as q2A  increases,  and if the solution  is not at the kink at c11 =R, then cl,>R, and C22A>C22B  With
c,,>R, then  C22A~=CHXYR>C 22B, from concavity  of U(.),  we have U'(c 11)XfR>U'(c 22B)X/R,  and as a result,
V'(c,,) is strictly decreasing  in q2A-
c  X  -[U  (c22A) - U'(c22)  - (c2,  - c22A)U (c22B)] <0,  because  at  the  optimm
aq2A  R  2
C22eC2B  and  concavity  of  U(  ) implies  both  U (c=A)<U (c22)  and  U  (c22d<O.
Combined  with the previous result that *"(c, 1)<0, this implies that  -1  . -a  (c,)  *"(cI 1).  < o,and the
optimal  value of c,, is decreasing  in q2A. This proves  Proposition  2.
Appendix II
The remaining  details of the example  where  q2A=.3  and the scale of the banking  industry is the
smallest  such that the bank need not trade in secondary  markets  are as follows.
Each investor  invests  .65035  directly  in long-term  assets at date 0, and as a result directly  holds a
claim worth 1.3007=2(.65035)  if held until date-2. Each investor  deposits  .34965  in short-term  deposits
issued  by the bank,  and accepts  a deposit  contract  with that returns  r,=.43357  if withdrawn  at date-I or
r2=.53146,  if held until date 2.
The  market clears at date 1 without  any trade from the bank. The date-I value  of long-term  assets
supplied  is ql(l- P)X(R/X)=0.13007,  and the date-I value of maturing  assets offered  in exchange  is
92Ar 1=0.  13007.
The bank delivers  these returns by investing  the .34965  (per-capita)  in 0.2168  short term assets, and
300.1328 long-term assets.  The bank has .2168 to fund date-I withdrawals, and a fraction q,+q2 ,=. 2+.3=.5 are
withdrawn then, giving each .2168/.5=.43357.
The bank delivers r 2 =  .5312 to those who leave their money in the bank until date-2.  The type 2B
depositors leave their money in the bank until date 2, and type 2B's are a fraction .5 of the initial depositors.
The bank has date-2 maturing assets worth .1328(X)=.1328(2)=.2656, implying that each type 2B depositor
receives .2656/.5 = .5312.
At date 1, both types I and 2A withdraw r,: type I's consume and type 2A's  invest directly.
A type I consumer sells his or her long-term assets at date 1, for price b, = 1/2 per unit of date-2 value, and
thus a type  I consumes a total of:  c,, =  r, +  w2b,=.4336 + 1.3008(1/2)=1.084.  Type 2A reinvests the r,
withdrawn from the bank, obtaining date 2 consumption of r,/b,, for total date-2 consumption of:
C2 2A=  w 2 +  r,/b,=  1.3008+.4336/('/2)=2.168.
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